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EDITOR’S NOTE
In February 2020, Penn’s Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics (LDI) held a conference, Medicare 
for All and Beyond: Expanding Coverage, Containing Costs, which included a panel discussion on the value 
of giving consumers a choice of health insurers.1 At that time, “choice” was a rallying cry for proponents and 
opponents of various health care reform proposals. Since then, COVID-19 has shifted many people’s health 
care priorities. While the full impact of the pandemic remains to be seen, the nation will inevitably return to 
important policy debates around health care reform. The role of consumer choice in health insurance will 
be central to those debates.  
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WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT  
HEALTH INSURANCE CHOICE?  
Lessons for health care reform
INTRODUCTION 
From choosing a doctor to selecting an insurance plan, choices 
pervade nearly all aspects of our health care system. However, 
there is little agreement among policymakers and the public about 
what constitutes “choice,” which choices are important, and how 
and whether patients should be asked to make various health care 
choices.2 Although Americans claim to value having health insurance 
choices, research shows that when presented with options, people 
do not actually like to choose. Other studies suggest that people 
frequently make health insurance decisions that leave them worse off, 
or not much better than before. 
At Penn LDI’s Medicare for All and Beyond conference, a panel of 
researchers and policy experts discussed the current evidence around 
health insurance choice and implications for future health care reform 
efforts.1 This brief summarizes the panel’s key takeaways.
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THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE  
CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE REFORM
“Choice” has featured prominently in the recent health care reform 
debate about insurance coverage. Opponents to a single-payer plan, 
such as Medicare for All, argue that it would limit Americans’ ability 
to select their coverage and care.3 However, supporters contend 
that while single-payer would eliminate choice of health plan, it may 
expand choice of provider. Since most providers would be in the same 
government-run plan, consumers would have a larger selection of 
doctors, hospitals, and other providers than under our current multi-
payer system. Others advocate for a more incremental approach to 
insurance expansion. For instance, a “public option” such as Medicaid 
buy-in or Medicare Extra for All, would increase health insurance 
choice because all individuals would become eligible to enroll in public 
insurance.5, 6 Similarly, proposals to lower the Medicare eligibility age 
would expand health insurance choice by allowing individuals to enroll 
in public coverage earlier in life. Unlike a single-payer plan that would 
eliminate private insurance, under a public option, people would still 
have the choice to enroll in a private plan.7 
The role of choice in health insurance is not new. According to 
Hoffman (2020), the issue of choice in health policy can be traced 
back decades, at least to the reproductive rights and disability rights 
movement.8 Health insurance choice first appeared on the health 
policy main stage during the Nixon health reform proposal of 1974, 
and again in the Clinton health reform proposal of 1993. The Clinton 
proposal, which emphasized plan competition, required that every 
consumer be offered a choice of at least three different plans in their 
region.9, 10 Hoffman notes that the idea of “choice” quickly became 
ingrained in public programs administered by private insurers, such 
as Medicare Part D prescription coverage, Medicare Advantage, 
and Medicaid managed care.8 Health insurance choice was also 
a cornerstone of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which created 
individual and small group marketplaces to expand coverage and 
put consumers “back in charge” of their care.11, 12 The marketplaces, 
along with pre-existing condition protections, community rating and 
guaranteed issue requirements, and Medicaid expansion, gave millions 
of individuals new options for coverage.13 
As policymakers and the public contemplate the next era of reform, 
it is important to re-examine the implicit assumptions surrounding 
health insurance choice, and the current evidence on how that choice 
actually plays out in practice.
CHOOSING TO NOT CHOOSE 
Americans say they value choice, but evidence suggests that people 
do not actually like to choose. In the context of health insurance, 
consumers who can switch health plans rarely do, often foregoing 
hundreds of dollars in savings.14, 15 This is true for employees choosing 
employer-sponsored health insurance, Medicare beneficiaries 
choosing a prescription drug plan, Medicaid enrollees choosing a 
managed care plan, and people choosing individual coverage on the 
health insurance marketplaces. How can we understand this paradox 
of choosing to not choose?
Some people may want to avoid the hassle associated with choosing 
or switching plans. Changing plans can generate substantial “switching 
costs,” in terms of time, effort, and psychological stress.16 Similarly, 
people tend to stick to their current state of affairs (i.e., status quo 
bias) and overestimate potential losses while underestimating 
potential gains (i.e., loss aversion). Consumers are also less likely to 
make active choices when they are faced with too many options or 
complex information. This choice overload can interact with status 
quo bias, leading many people to end up with the default plan when 
enrolling in or renewing their coverage.17-19 
CHOOSING UNWISELY
Even if people can overcome these barriers, exercising choice does 
not always deliver much value. A large body of research shows that 
we frequently make decisions that leave us worse off, or not much 
better than before.17, 20 Underlying the value of choice is the economic 
behavioral assumption that consumers will make choices based on 
well-ordered preferences, and that these preferences determine 
our willingness to pay. Why, then, do we make suboptimal health 
insurance choices? 
“Choice” has featured prominently in the 
recent health care reform debate about 
insurance coverage. Opponents to a 
single-payer plan, such as Medicare for 
All, argue that it would limit Americans’ 
ability to select their coverage and care.  
First, information about the value of different health plans may not 
be readily observable to consumers, making it difficult to choose the 
optimal plan.21 Second, our preferences for intangible goods (such as 
health care services that we have never experienced) are not always 
clear or well-ordered.8 
Lastly, many people do not have the necessary financial literacy to 
evaluate their health care options, and lack a basic understanding 
of health plan characteristics. In one study, most people expressed 
confidence in their ability to comprehend their health insurance, but 
only 14 percent could correctly identify the four main components 
of a health plan (copay, coinsurance, deductible, and out-of-pocket 
maximum).22 Even people with above-average financial literacy skills 
struggle to choose among health plans, selecting the most cost-
effective plan on a simulated health insurance marketplace only half of 
the time.23 
INFLUENCING CHOICE
Studies show that our views can be influenced. In a recent experiment, 
James Fishkin and colleagues found that even Americans’ “staunchly 
held” political beliefs can be changed in a matter of days. Bringing 
together over 500 registered voters, Fishkin found that many 
participants’ views on health care reform changed significantly after 
a weekend of dialogue and deliberation. For instance, Republicans’ 
support for ACA repeal declined from 70 to 48 percent, while 
Democrats’ support for Medicare for All decreased from 70 percent 
to 46 percent.24 
While these high-level views of health care reform can be changed, 
evidence suggests more limited success in improving people’s choices 
on health insurance marketplaces to maximize personal value. Some 
consumer choices can be influenced by changing choice architecture 
(i.e., how we frame information) or subtle nudges (i.e., behavioral 
prompts). The ACA tried techniques such as plan standardization, 
grouping plans by metal level, and decision-support tools to help 
marketplace enrollees make more optimal plan selections.19 However, 
in some instances, metal levels confused shoppers and resulted in 
worse plan choice.25 Interventions such as smart defaults (which 
present preselected plan options based on an individual’s health care 
use) can substantially improve consumers’ abilities to enroll in cost-
effective plans, though these defaults dampen the degree of “choice” 
involved.23 
In one experiment, Colorado marketplace enrollees received one 
of two messages that highlighted potential savings from switching 
plans: a generic message that indicated the possibility of savings, or 
a personalized message with specific premium savings information. 
Though both nudges increased consumer shopping by 23 percent, 
few consumers actually switched plans.26
CHOICE, AUTONOMY, AND TRUST
Some panelists suggested that our desire for health insurance choice 
is not actually about choice, but autonomy. This implies that our 
concerns about choice may vary by the level of trust we place in other 
agents or stakeholders (such as the government, our employer, or 
the market) to structure our health insurance options. As the panel 
discussed, much of the resistance towards a single-payer plan may 
stem from Americans’ distrust of the government to make health 
insurance choices for us and design a high-quality plan that is effective 
for everyone. Transparency and oversight play a key role in whether 
we trust another actor to make choices on our behalf and whether we 
value the choices they present to us. Concerns about autonomy and 
trust ultimately make it difficult to limit or eliminate people’s health 
insurance options.
CONCLUSION 
Implications for Health Care Reform
Given the mixed evidence around the value of health insurance 
choice, what role should it play in the next era of health care reform? 
Here we offer a few insights for policymakers as they consider 
different proposals.
•   Further enhancing choice should not be the primary goal 
of health care reform. When it comes to health plan choice, 
consumers have a lot of options, but having choices does not 
seem to make people better off. Moreover, offering more health 
plan choices does not necessarily mean that they also will be 
more affordable.27 Health care reform should focus on improving 
quality and affordability – the number one concern of health 
care consumers – rather than maximizing choice.
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As the panel discussed, much of the resistance 
towards a single-payer plan may stem from 
Americans’ distrust of the government to make 
health insurance choices for us and design a 
high-quality plan that is effective for everyone. 
•   There is often a tradeoff between choice of health plan and 
choice of provider. A single-payer system where all providers 
are under the same plan would eliminate health plan choice, 
but likely increase provider choice. In a system that preserves 
our current multi-payer structure (such as a public option or 
expanded Medicare eligibility), this dynamic is flipped: we may 
have greater health plan choices, but more restricted provider 
options in any one plan. When crafting a health care reform 
proposal, policymakers will have to decide which type of “choice” 
to prioritize.
•   We should make plan selection simpler. As we have seen 
with the ACA and consumer shopping studies, some strategies 
could help improve plan selection, including offering simplified 
and standardized plan options, defaults, financial calculators, 
and nudges.28 Whether policymakers pursue sweeping health 
care reform, make incremental changes, or stick with the status 
quo, policies should be designed to help people make easier 
and better decisions in all health care contexts, including plan 
selection.
•   Having fewer, well understood choices, may help preserve 
autonomy. As our panelists suggested, our desire for options 
may reflect our desire for autonomy. However, in a market where 
health insurance options are confusing and expensive, having 
more choices does not necessarily increase consumers’ sense 
of autonomy. When crafting a health care reform proposal, 
policymakers should consider whether offering a smaller set of 
choices – if well understood by consumers – could preserve 
consumers’ autonomy. 
Heath insurance choice will undoubtedly play a role in the next era of 
health care reform. However, it should not be considered an intrinsic 
good, nor as a feature of only one type of reform. Policymakers will 
be tasked with deciding whether reform should enhance or constrain 
health insurance choice, and the tradeoffs associated with each 
option. Where choice is constrained, decisionmakers – whether 
policymakers, payers, providers, or consumers – must be explicit and 
strive for transparency.
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Health care reform should focus on improving 
quality and affordability – the number 
one concern of health care consumers 
– rather than maximizing choice.
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